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By Kevin Outterson, John H. Powers, Gregory W. Daniel, and Mark B. McClellan
Repairing The Broken Market For
Antibiotic Innovation
ABSTRACT Multidrug-resistant bacterial diseases pose serious and growing
threats to human health. While innovation is important to all areas of
health research, it is uniquely important in antibiotics. Resistance
destroys the fruit of prior research, making it necessary to constantly
innovate to avoid falling back into a pre-antibiotic era. But investment is
declining in antibiotics, driven by competition from older antibiotics, the
cost and uncertainty of the development process, and limited
reimbursement incentives. Good public health practices curb
inappropriate antibiotic use, making return on investment challenging in
payment systems based on sales volume. We assess the impact of recent
initiatives to improve antibiotic innovation, reflecting experience with all
sixty-seven new molecular entity antibiotics approved by the Food and
Drug Administration since 1980. Our analysis incorporates data and
insights derived from several multistakeholder initiatives under way
involving governments and the private sector on both sides of the
Atlantic. We propose three specific reforms that could revitalize
innovations that protect public health, while promoting long-term
sustainability: increased incentives for antibiotic research and
development, surveillance, and stewardship; greater targeting of
incentives to high-priority public health needs, including reimbursement
that is delinked from volume of drug use; and enhanced global
collaboration, including a global treaty.
T
he public health threat from anti-
biotic-resistant diseases is grow-
ing, especially attributable to
Gram-negative bacteria. The Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) recently issued a national threat
assessment1 documenting the looming crisis of
antibiotic-resistant diseases, yet the pipeline of
high-quality treatments remains thin.
Evidence supports the view that existing busi-
ness models provide inadequate economic sup-
port for the creation and use of valuable anti-
biotic therapies.2 Policy makers have taken
notice, and several high-level initiatives are un-
der way on both sides of the Atlantic to examine
these economic issues andproposenewbusiness
models. President BarackObama recently issued
Executive Order 13676 on combating antibiotic-
resistant bacteria,3 released together with a na-
tional strategy4 and a report from the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.5
In England, Prime Minister David Cameron re-
cently appointed the Review on Antimicrobial
Resistance,6 building onwork by England’s chief
medical officer, Dame Sally Davies. The Europe-
an Union (EU) has implemented the New Drugs
for Bad Bugs (ND4BB) program in the Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative, a public-private part-
doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2014.1003
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nership currently funded at €686 million (ap-
proximately US$800 million).7 One of those
projects—DRIVE-AB—will develop and test bet-
ter business models for antibiotics.7 Major think
tanks are also involved, including the Brookings
Institution, the Pew Charitable Trusts, Chatham
House, and the Wellcome Trust. And the World
Health Organization is developing a global ac-
tion plan on antimicrobial resistance.8
In this article we review the evidence and pres-
ent new findings on weaknesses in the existing
business model for antibiotic development in
priority need areas.We then evaluate recent ini-
tiatives that attempt to remedy the situation.We
conclude with three proposals to protect the
most effective drug class in history.
Antibiotic Innovation Under The
Historical Business Model
Pharmaceutical companies allocate research
funds with the expectation of a return on invest-
ment. Company revenues are determined on a
price/volume model: Higher volumes or higher
prices (or both) yield higher revenues. Most
profits are earned during the first years after
introduction, especially with legal protection
from generic entry. Particularly active areas cur-
rently include oncology and hepatitis C, with the
introduction of new specialty drugs at very high
prices. In contrast, the return on investment is
relatively low for antibiotics as a result of low
prices, limited market uptake, and modest gov-
ernment financial support.
Low Prices Antibiotics were the original won-
der drugs, but they have never been very expen-
sive. In community settings, some US pharma-
cies offergeneric antibiotics free (ornearly so) to
drive traffic to their stores. In US hospitals, anti-
biotics are generally included within a bundled
payment, giving hospitals strong financial in-
centives to limit the introduction ofmore expen-
sive drugs unless clinically necessary. In both
settings, new antibiotics compete against an ar-
ray of low-cost generics that remain effective
enough to suppress pricing for the vast majority
of clinical applications. As a result, antibiotics
accounted for 6.4 percent of all US prescriptions
in 2013 but only 2.6 percent by value.9
Market Uptake Is Limited Over the past few
years US antibiotic prescriptions per capita have
declined compared to all prescription drugs (see
Exhibit 1). US antibiotic sales peaked in 2005
(see Exhibit 2). Most recent antibiotics have
been approved on the basis of noninferiority
trials10 and so do not come to market with dem-
onstrated superiority in efficacy or safety.While
there is some portfolio value in antibiotic diver-
sity, a true breakout antibiotic product will need
evidence of superiority for important unmet
medical needs.
A recent review of three decades of newmolec-
ular entity antibiotic approvals and withdrawals
found that many antibiotics approved in the
1980s and 1990s had difficulty competing
against already approveddrugs.11 Antibiotics suf-
fered market withdrawals at three times the rate
of other drugs. Causes for withdrawal varied, but
little evidence supports resistance as a cause
since drugs that remain on the market have sim-
ilar resistance profiles. Interrelated causes in-
cluded safety problems, lack of superior efficacy
compared to existing treatments, and lack of
market success.
Furthermore, stewardship programs appro-
priately lead to limits on antibiotic market up-
take.12 Successful antibiotic education13 and
vaccination campaigns14 have been partially re-
sponsible for the reduction in US antibiotic use
andwould also be expected to restrict themarket
for new antibiotics.
Finally, the value of new antibiotics for resis-
tant diseases is not solely for the patients who
actually use the antibiotics. Rather, it is also for
everyone in thebroaderpopulationwhodoesnot
develop resistant infections because of the well-
targeted use of new antibiotics. That public
health value is not captured in the willingness
to pay on the part of a specific patient or his or
her health plan and thus in pricing models.
Government Financial Support Is Not
Growing Theprincipal US government financial
support for antibiotic research and development
is through the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and the Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority (BARDA). While
the NIH does not publicly categorize spending
Exhibit 1
Per Capita US Prescriptions, Antibiotic And Total, 2009–13
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on data from IMS Health (see Note 9 in text), and US Census
Bureau (July 1 census estimates each year). NOTES Antibiotic prescriptions are denoted by the or-
ange solid graph line and relate to the left-hand y axis. Total US prescriptions are denoted by the blue
dotted graph line and relate to the right-hand y axis.
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separately for bacterial resistance, overall spend-
ing on antimicrobial resistance is flat in real
terms, reflecting secular trends in NIH funding
(see Exhibit 3). BARDA funding has been impor-
tant but faces similar challenges, even as the
program has become more central to advancing
antibiotic development. Funding in Europe has
been modest in recent years.15
Additional government research funding is
provided by the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, which
supports many drug research and development
programs, but it does not appear to be a good fit
for antibiotics. While 464 drugs and biologics
with orphan drug designations had reached
the market as of October 2014, only ten treated
bacterial disease, and none of those targeted dis-
ease attributable to resistant pathogens identi-
fied in the CDC threat assessment (see online
Appendix Exhibit A).16 Of the sixty-seven new
molecular entity antibiotics approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since
1980, only one initially entered the market with
orphan drug designation: bedaquiline for multi-
drug-resistant tuberculosis.
Antibiotics face special difficulties in meet-
ing the criterion for orphan drugs—diseases or
disorders affecting fewer than 200,000 US
residents.17 The number of US patients cur-
rently hospitalized with pathogens such as car-
bapenem-resistantEnterobacteriaceae falls below
the numerical threshold for orphan drug desig-
nation. However, lack of diagnostics and empir-
ical administration of study drugs means that
most clinical studies cannot focus solely on pa-
tients with resistant diseases but rather enroll
broader groups of patients. In clinical practice,
the lack of rapid diagnostics for many infectious
diseases results in empirical prescribing outside
the target population, which does not occur in
many other orphan diseases such as inbornmet-
abolic diseases. Furthermore, even if antibiotics
for resistant diseases could be targeted effective-
ly with better diagnostics, that would likely ex-
acerbate the revenue challenges by reducing the
market potential for new antibiotics even more
than at present.
Companies Do Not Regard Antibiotics As
Profitable For all of these reasons, companies
find that the return on investment is relatively
low for antibiotics.18 In a recent analysis for the
Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), the Eastern Research Group found ex-
pected net present values for several categories
of antibiotic research to be remarkably low and
in somecasesnegative. Inno casedidnet present
values exceed a target benchmark of $100 mil-
lion, because of the factors mentioned above,
including low prices and slow market uptake.19
From a commercial standpoint, drug companies
might not risk expending capital over the prod-
uct development cycle if the expected returns
from antibiotics are so low but instead may shift
funds to other drug categories with higher earn-
ing potential. These low antibiotic valuations
stand in sharp contrast to the social value of
antibiotics and willingness-to-pay estimates,
which are much higher.19
Recent Initiatives To Improve
Antibiotic Innovation
Many stakeholders are working on possible sol-
utions to these economic problems with anti-
biotic business models.We review four potential
Exhibit 2
US Antibiotic Sales For Human Use, In 2013 Constant Dollars, By Mode Of Administration,
1998–2013
SOURCES IMS Health (US manufacturer US dollar sales at ex-manufacturer prices), and St. Louis
Federal Gross Domestic Product deflator (2013 = 100).
Exhibit 3
National Institutes Of Health Research Spending On Antimicrobial Resistance Research,
United States, Fiscal Years 2010–15
SOURCE National Institutes of Health (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) Research
Portfolio Online Reporting Tool, Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease
Categories (August 20, 2014). NOTES Adjusted annually for US Consumer Price Index, fiscal year (FY)
2010 base. American Recovery And Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding is for FY 2010 only. aEsti-
mated.
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interventions across the antibiotic life cycle and
then assess their impact on innovation.
Clinical Trial Simplification After receiv-
ing direction from Congress, the FDA recently
issued guidance simplifying antibiotic clinical
trials, allowing approval with quantitatively less
evidence of safety and efficacy.20 The European
Medicines Agency, the FDA’s counterpart in Eu-
rope, has taken similar steps. Legislation is pro-
posed in Congress to permit some antibiotics to
reach themarketwith even less evidence, such as
a single, very small clinical trial combined with
other evidence.21 The Antibiotic Development to
AdvancePatientTreatment (ADAPT) legislation,
if passed, would permit early release with such
limited studies, but with a label stating: “This
drug is indicated for use in a limited and specific
population of patients.”
The ADAPT Act and other forms of limited
approval will get some antibiotics to market
more quickly with less data than is currently
the case. If the drugs are effective, this can im-
prove outcomes for patients with otherwise un-
treatable infections. Since the patient numbers
will be small, this reform will not improve inno-
vation incentives unless the reimbursement per
patient is dramatically higher or there is a clear
pathway for much broader use. But if pricing or
efforts to expand use are aggressive, then ques-
tionswill be raised about resistance andwhether
the quality of the evidence on efficacy and safety
adequately justifies increased costs. Higher
prices also raise questions about access and com-
panies’ incentives for marketing beyond the
limited population. Current reimbursement ca-
pabilities by payers also would be unable to sup-
port variable antibiotic pricing.
A better approach may be contractual, in
which the companyagreed to enforceable restric-
tions on marketing and use in exchange for
temporary limited approval, pending required
completion of the normal confirmatory trials
(adequately powered human clinical trials with
patient-centered outcomes). Postmarketing
commitments have been difficult to enforce, so
additional steps to limit utilization (for example,
use of narrow coverage rules by payers) and oth-
er steps as described below may be needed.
These issues highlight why additional clinical
trial simplification is unlikely to be a major in-
novation driver. The Eastern Research Group
report calculated that reaching the $100 million
net present value benchmark would require ex-
traordinary increases in trial efficiency—for ex-
ample, reductions in clinical trial time by up to
75 percent or more.19 Such drastic reductions
seem implausible, especially given reductions
already achieved through recent initiatives.
Moreover, reductions in clinical trial standards
may lead to approvals with more limited safety
and efficacy data, whichmight entail risks to the
public22 and make it more difficult for payers to
support higher reimbursement.
Public-Private Partnerships To Support
Clinical Trials Public-private partnerships
have led to notable progress in drug develop-
ment for infectious diseases. One example is
the TB Alliance, which has accelerated the devel-
opment of new treatments for drug-resistant tu-
berculosis.23 The most prominent public-private
partnerships in antibiotics are BARDA in the
United States and ND4BB in the European
Union. BARDA support has been an important
source of nondilutive capital for some high-
profile antibiotics in the pipeline (see Exhibit 4).
For example, in a recent agreement with Glaxo-
SmithKline, BARDA committed up to $200 mil-
lion for antibiotic research. The funding struc-
ture allows for switching among projects based
onmilestones. This approach ismodeled on how
private funding is allocated within companies:
Further funding follows demonstrated progress.
Another interestingexample in theUnitedStates
is theAntibacterial Resistance LeadershipGroup
sponsored by the NIH, which is building more
efficient clinical trial networks for antibiotics.
In the European Union, ND4BB has commit-
ted €686 million thus far.7 One project under
ND4BB—DRIVE-AB—is focused on improving
business models for antibiotic access, use, and
development, with an emphasis on delinkage of
revenues from sales volume.7
While BARDA andND4BB have had successes,
they have been limited by their funding. BARDA
has also been historically focused on a biode-
fense mission, although this recently changed
with President Obama’s Executive Order 13676.3
Additional Market Exclusivity Incentives
In 2012, following the model used to encourage
development of orphan drugs and pediatric
drugs, the Generating Antibiotics Incentives
Now (GAIN) Act granted five years of additional
The value of new
antibiotics for
resistant diseases is
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market exclusivity for “qualifying infectious dis-
ease products.” As of December 29, 2014, four
antibiotics have reached the USmarket with this
designation (dalbavancin, tedizolid, oritavan-
cin, and ceftolozane/tazobactam), and at least
sixty additional drugs in the pipeline have been
so designated.
Qualifying infectious disease product designa-
tions should not be interpreted as evidence of
accelerated antibiotic development. The four
drugs mentioned above had been in develop-
ment for many years before the 2012 law passed.
None of them was approved based on studies
designed to prospectively demonstrate superior
efficacy compared to the older drugs to which
they were compared. Thus, in these cases, this
designation was something of a windfall for
sponsors, mirroring questions raised about the
extent to which another recent drug innovation
initiative—Priority Review vouchers—has pro-
vided effective incentives for needed innova-
tion.24 (These vouchers allow companies to jump
the queue at the FDA and obtain faster approval
on a non-Priority Review drug. The triggering
event to award a voucher is when the FDA ap-
proves a new treatment for a qualifying ne-
glected disease. The voucher may then be sold
for use on a different drug.)25
Even for new research programs, there is rea-
son to doubt whether designation as a qualifying
infectious disease product is an important inno-
vation incentive. In the Eastern Research Group
report, additional years of exclusivity did not
significantly improve incentives because of the
time value of money: When initial research
projects are evaluated, the prospect of five addi-
tional years of exclusivity twenty years hence is
deeply discounted. Indeed, even infinite exten-
sions of exclusivity did not yield net present val-
ues achieving the $100million benchmark.19 The
GAIN Act was scored as budget-neutral, another
indication that its impact on economic incen-
tives will be small in its first decade.
Furthermore, the qualified infectious disease
product model might not be well targeted to
high-priority antibiotic needs. First, although
qualifying products are “intended to treat seri-
ous or life threatening infections,” this language
is much weaker than the standard applied to
Priority Review drugs, which requires the
sponsor to also demonstrate significant im-
provements in safety or effectiveness. Second,
although the statute mentions “resistant patho-
gens,” the final FDA list is very broad, covering
both resistant and susceptible bacteria. Most
striking is the absence of any prioritizationwith-
in the list, contrasting with the CDC’s approach
in the threat assessment. Almost every major
pathogenic microorganism is included.26
It is difficult to identify any new molecular
entity antibiotic approved by the FDA since
1980 thatwouldnothavebeen consideredaqual-
ified infectious disease product. As a result, we
can expect almost every new antibiotic to receive
this designation. Thus far, the FDA has granted
qualified infectious disease product status to ev-
ery antibiotic that has properly applied.
A better approach would be larger incentives
than in the qualified infectious disease product
designation, more closely targeted to priority
therapeutic needs. Meaningful incentives will
require something other than longer exclusivity
and should be heavily weighted to the most ur-
gent threats and therapies with the greatest
added benefits.
Reimbursement Reforms New approaches to
antibiotic reimbursement are being explored in
the United States in Medicare and in Europe
through the work of Chatham House and
DRIVE-AB. Traditionally, Medicare payments
for inpatient antibiotics are based on Medicare
severity diagnosis-related groups (MS-DRGs).
The MS-DRG system is based on a set of fixed
payment rates derived from the average treat-
ment costs for a group of bundled services de-
fined by specific diagnoses and other clinical
characteristics.27 While this creates incentives
for hospitals to operate efficiently, MS-DRG
rates based on historical average costs can create
Exhibit 4
Biomedical Advanced Research And Development Authority’s Broad Spectrum Antibiotic
(BSA)–Supported Product Pipeline, 2014
SOURCE Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). NOTES The projects in
this exhibit are supported by BARDA’s Broad Spectrum Antibiotic (BSA) Program utilizing nondilutive
funding via a contract and/or agreement. The stage of development is approximate as of July 2014
(please refer to the sponsors’ websites for updated information). The exhibit represents the com-
pounds’ most advanced commercial indication being pursued by the developer. UTI is urinary tract
infection. MDR is multidrug resistant.
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disincentives for hospitals to use newer, more
expensive technologies not yet accounted for in
the MS-DRG calculations.
New technology add-on payments are viewed
as a promisingworkaround. Introduced in 2001,
such payments are a bridge to reimburse hospi-
tals for the excess costs of new technologies not
yet accounted for in the MS-DRGs during the
first two to three years of product marketing.28
Fidaxomicin for the treatment of Clostridium dif-
ficile diarrhea was granted new technology add-
on payments beginning in 2012, providing an
additional $868 per course, but only when the
cost of the case exceeded the standard MS-DRG
amount.29 Fidaxomicin was superior to vanco-
mycin, whose generic cost is about $120 per
fourteen-day course of treatment, in sustained
cure of C. difficile diarrhea, while noninferior on
initial resolution.30
New technology add-on payments provide
only short-term reimbursement adjustments
for hospitals—that is, only long enough for the
added cost to be reflected in the standard DRG
amount. This process may have limited financial
impact. In the first three months only thirty-
eight new technology add-on payment claims
were submitted by hospitals to CMS for fidaxo-
micin. Fidaxomicin recently failed to receive an
extension of the add-on payment beyond the
initial two years. Furthermore, these payments
are awarded only for new technologieswith dem-
onstrated “substantial clinical improvement”
over existing therapies—a challenging require-
ment for antibiotic development, since most
antibiotic clinical trials for approval are de-
signed to demonstrate noninferiority rather
than superiority. In 2014 the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) denied a new
technology add-on payment for dalbavancin for
failing to demonstrate “substantial clinical im-
provement” over existing therapy for acute bac-
terial skin and skin structure infections.31 Dalba-
vancin was not superior in efficacy or safety to
vancomycin but claimed improved convenience
through once-weekly dosing.32
In March 2014 the Developing an Innovative
Strategy for Antimicrobial Resistant Microor-
ganisms (DISARM) Act of 2014 was introduced
in Congress. DISARM, if passed, would create an
additional add-on payment to theMS-DRG, sim-
ilar to the new technology add-on payment, but
as a permanent carve-out. This payment reform
would apply only to antibiotics used in acute care
hospitals that receive payments under Medicare
fee-for-service (Part A) while participating in the
Antimicrobial Usemodule of the CDC’s National
Healthcare Safety Network (or an alternative
programdetermined byHHS). BecauseDISARM
is budget-neutral, one challenge faced by hospi-
tals is that the increased payments for qualifying
antibioticswould come froma lowerbase rate for
the MS-DRG.
As originally introduced, DISARM applies to
most qualified infectious disease products. The
practical effect may be to exempt most new hos-
pital antibiotics from the MS-DRG and, there-
fore, from the pressure to limit low-value treat-
ments created by the DRG system. Once again, a
more effective alternative would be to target in-
centives to the antibiotics thatmost improve out-
comes for patients. This alternative version of
DISARM is being explored in Congress because
it results in a significantly lower budget impact
and targets incentives more carefully.
In the outpatient setting, reimbursement rates
for antibiotics are typically based on average sell-
ing price or some cost-to-charge ratio. Tradition-
ally, low rates are a result of competition with
low-cost generics and theabsenceofdemonstrat-
ed superiority.33
Even if DISARM or similar reforms allow for
higher prices, add-on payments as a percentage
of drug price and conventional outpatient re-
imbursement still encourage higher sales vol-
ume instead of rewarding appropriate use. Com-
prehensive payment reforms for both settings
are needed that move away from price/volume
models toward rewarding better outcomes for
patients and appropriate use, while ensuring ap-
propriate access for patients.
Some more fundamental reforms to antibiotic
reimbursement are being developed, particular-
ly in Europe in the ChathamHouse process2 and
the recently launched DRIVE-AB project by the
European Union.7 One prominent model is “de-
linkage,” which severs company revenues from
sales volumes, reducing economic incentives for
companies and other stakeholders to inappro-
priately market, sell, or use antibiotics. Under
delinkage, companies will be rewarded for deliv-
Meaningful incentives
should be heavily
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ering new products to the market but with alter-
native payment streams such as registration
prizes, patent licenses, service contracts, or pay-
ments akin to insurance premiums. Major phar-
maceutical companies such as GlaxoSmithKline
have expressed support for delinkage, while
others are still evaluating the concept and have
concerns about whether adequate payments will
materialize. One goal of the DRIVE-AB project is
to develop and test feasible delinkage models
that work for all stakeholders.
Building Better Antibiotic Business
Models
Three key features are needed to improve inno-
vation and sustainably preserve antibiotics.
These features are described below.
Increase Incentives Across Product Life
Cycles Building better business models will re-
quire incentives both before and after a newdrug
is approved, tailored to the unique requirements
of each period.
First, government-funded basic research is the
foundation for biomedical innovation. These
programs are working well, but funding should
be larger and more stable. NIH funding under-
writes human capital in research and early-stage
work that the private sector cannot adequately
fund. The Eastern Research Group report sug-
gests that such incentives could have a substan-
tial impact.19 A reasonable target was set in the
US national strategy to combat antibiotic-
resistant bacteria: doubling inflation-adjusted
US government spending on bacterial resistance
and related research, including surveillance, in-
fection control, vaccines, diagnostics, and other
nonantibiotic treatments. The national strategy
also proposed sizable increases in BARDA fund-
ing relating to achieving important milestones
toward antibiotic development. Properly tar-
geted, these initiatives will stoke the pipeline
with higher-quality projects.
An additional source of nondilutive capital
could be refundable tax credits, perhaps mod-
eled on legislation similar to the Orphan Drug
Act. However, the same benefits could be
achievedmore directly throughNIH and BARDA
expansions, as the tax system has no easy mech-
anism to target credits to priority antibiotics.
These incentives affect company bottom lines
immediately rather than decades in the future.
To raise net present values, the amount of capital
needed in clinical trial phases may range up to
several hundred million dollars per molecule.19
Second, postapproval reimbursement reform
must be comprehensive across all settings.Medi-
care can lead this effort in the United States with
the involvement of private payers. Payments
might be tied to availability of an antibiotic for
the covered population rather than to volume,
and eventually to outcomes such as reducedmor-
bidity and mortality in the covered population
from resistant infections.
The sizeof additional spending shouldbe large
but worthwhile, totaling perhaps $1 billion per
successful high-priority antibiotic.19 The United
States spent $8.6 billion for humanantibiotics in
2013.9 At a societal level, an additional premium
should be paid in order to sustainably preserve
antibiotic effectiveness, akin to an insurancepol-
icy against returning to an era without effective
antibiotics. Simply restoring theUnited States to
2005 spending levels in real terms would fully
fund the national strategy.
Target Incentives Carefully The FDA ap-
proved a largenumber of relatively unimpressive
antibiotics in the 1980s and 1990s, as reflected in
their discontinuation from clinical use and with-
drawal from themarket.11 These drugswerewith-
drawn for interrelated reasons including safety,
lack of added benefits over available therapies,
and poor commercial sales. That experiencemay
be repeated unless incentives are carefully fo-
cused on the biggest threats and the greatest
benefits.While this article focuses on antibiotics,
it is necessary to look beyond just drugs and
include incentives for vaccines, diagnostics that
change clinical practices, and nonantibiotic in-
novations that reduce the burden of resistant
bacterial infections.
The funnelmust bewidest at the basic research
stage, allowing theNIH to fundadiverse rangeof
fundamental research programs including a
number of “long-shot” projects (see Appendix
Exhibit B).16 Standards will need to be tighter
in the development phase, with larger payments
for achieving developmental milestones for
priority antibiotics supported by a larger but
carefully targeted BARDA program. Enhanced
reimbursement payments should have the nar-
rowest focus of all: limited toproducts that target
“serious” or “urgent” threats on the CDC threat
assessment or for products that represent an
Countries acting in
isolation can have
only a limited impact
on antibiotic
resistance.
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important improvement in efficacy or safety
against themost seriousmultidrug-resistant dis-
eases. Policymakers should not use the qualified
infectious disease product list for this purpose,
as every new antibiotic would qualify.
The public and politicians are appropriately
supporting action on antibiotic research and
development because of the threats posed by
“superbugs.” It would be a missed policy reform
opportunity, and poor use of scarce resources, if
most of the incentiveswent to less effectivedrugs
treating less threatening conditions and if pa-
tients who have current effective options are put
at risk from broad empirical usage of less well-
tested drugs.
Coordinate Globally Countries acting in iso-
lation can have only a limited impact on anti-
biotic resistance. Pathogens and resistant genes
do not respect borders. A key question is how
these efforts will be coordinated globally.
One model could be a Framework Convention
on Antibiotic Resistance.34 The Framework Con-
vention would set broad objectives for member
countries that could be implemented locally. The
key elements would be the ones we have de-
scribed here—enhancing basic research and de-
velopment support, reducing the cost of capital
for clinical trials, and reforming reimbursement
while supporting good stewardship—all targeted
to priority antibiotic development areas.
First, government funding of basic research
might be set at a target fraction of national anti-
biotic expenditures (20 percent would fully fund
the US national strategy). Similar commitments
could be set regarding surveillance of resistant
pathogens and antimicrobial stewardship in all
sectors including agriculture.
Second, countrieswould be encouraged to cre-
ate targeted programs that reduce the cost and
time of antibiotic clinical development and re-
place up to 50 percent of qualifying clinical re-
search expenses with nondilutive capital. Exam-
ples include the NIH, ND4BB, BARDA, and an
appropriately modified version of the Orphan
Drug Act.
Finally, all countries would commit to re-
imbursement reforms to pay for value as op-
posed to volume, eliminate financial incentives
for improper use of antibiotics, and ensure ap-
propriate access based on clinical need.
Since the market for antibiotics is currently
concentrated in high-income countries, the in-
novationwork could proceedwith just a relative-
ly small number of countries leading the way.
The United States, the European Union, and
other wealthy countries are prime candidates.
As antibioticmarkets are growing in Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and South Africa,35 wider par-
ticipation will be welcome. For stewardship, sur-
veillance, and access commitments, truly global
participation is needed, but that process can im-
prove incrementally over time.
Given the substantial and growing global in-
terest in antibiotic resistance, global progress
need not wait for a comprehensive formal agree-
ment. It is likely that some variationswill emerge
in the United States and Europe. Policy hetero-
geneity can work, so long as the reforms pull
in the same direction. The framework we de-
scribe here can be a basis for reinforcing action
globally.
Missing from the policy process for fighting
antimicrobial resistance is strong global patient
advocacy, which has proved to be effective with
other diseases. Patient advocacy provides politi-
cal thrust for policy reforms, investment funds,
andclinical developmentdata infrastructure.Ex-
amples include HIV/AIDS during the 1980s and
1990s and, more recently, cancer and cystic fi-
brosis. This is particularly challenging for anti-
microbial resistance, since there are additional
beneficiaries who do not develop resistant infec-
tions as a result of the success of these public
health efforts. In addition, most patients with
resistant infections identify more closely with
another comorbidity such as cancer or surgery,
instead of the resistant infectious disease.
Conclusion
The existing price/volume business model for
antibiotics is not working and is a key barrier
to achieving more rapid progress on resistance.
The United States, the European Union, and
other countries can build on recent promising
steps by boosting funding for basic research and
development, surveillance, and antibiotic stew-
ardship; targeting these initiatives to priority
unmet needs; and reforming reimbursement to
support effective antibiotic access and use rather
than volume.While the funding required is sig-
nificant, it is a critical investment, protecting a
key area of biomedical innovation from obsoles-
cence and avoiding the hazards of a post-
antibiotic era. ▪
NOTES
1 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Antibiotic resistance
threats in the United States, 2013
[Internet]. Atlanta (GA): CDC; 2013




2 Outterson K. New business models
Economics Of Innovation
284 Health Affairs February 2015 34:2
at PAPPAS LAW LIBRARY
 on February 26, 2015Health Affairs by content.healthaffairs.orgDownloaded from 
for sustainable antibiotics [Inter-
net]. London: Chatham House; 2014





3 The White House. Executive Order
13676: combating antibiotic-
resistant bacteria. Fed Regist. 2014
Sep 18;184(79):56931–5.
4 The White House. National strategy
for combating antibiotic-resistant
bacteria [Internet]. Washington
(DC): The White House; 2014 Sep




5 President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology. Report to
the President on combating anti-
biotic resistance [Internet]. Wash-
ington (DC): The White House; 2014





6 Department of Health. Prime Min-
ister warns of global threat of anti-
biotic resistance [Internet]. London:
Department of Health; 2014 Jul 2




7 Innovative Medicines Initiative.
ND4BB: new drugs for bad bugs
[Internet]. Brussels: IMI; [cited 2014
Dec 23]. Available from: http://
www.imi.europa.eu/content/nd4bb
8 World Health Organization. Anti-
microbial resistance [Internet]. Ge-
neva: WHO; 2014 May 24. Sixty-
seventh World Health Assembly,
WHA67.25, Agenda item 16.5; [cited
2014 Dec 23]. Available from: http://
apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/
WHA67/A67_R25-en.pdf
9 IMS Institute for Healthcare Infor-
matics. Medicine use and shifting
costs of healthcare: a review of the
use of medicines in the US in 2013
[Internet]. Danbury (CT): IMS
Health; 2014 Apr [cited 2014







10 Government Accountability Office.
New drug approval: FDA’s consid-
eration of evidence from certain
clinical trials [Internet].Washington
(DC): GAO; 2010 Jul [cited 2014
Dec 23]. (Report No. GAO-10-798).
Available from: http://www.gao
.gov/assets/310/308301.pdf
11 Outterson K, Powers JH, Seoane-
Vazquez E, Rodriguez-Monguio R,
Kesselheim AS. Approval and with-
drawal of new antibiotics and other
antiinfectives in the U.S., 1980–
2009. J Law Med Ethics. 2013;
41(3):688–96.
12 Kesselheim AS, Outterson K. Im-
proving antibiotic markets for long-
term sustainability. Yale J Health
Policy Law Ethics. 2011;11(1):101–67.
13 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Office-related antibiotic
prescribing for persons aged ≤ 14
years—United States, 1993–1994 to
2007–2008. Morb Mortal Wkly Rep.
2011;60(34):1153–6.
14 Hsu HE, Shutt KA, Moore MR, Beall
BW, Bennett NM, Craig AS, et al.
Effect of pneumococcal conjugate
vaccine on pneumococcal meningi-
tis. N Engl J Med. 2009;360(3):
244–56.
15 Bragginton EC, Piddock LJ. UK and
European Union public and chari-
table funding from 2008 to 2013 for
bacteriology and antibiotic research
in the UK: an observational study.
Lancet Infect Dis. 2014;14(9):
857–68.
16 To access the Appendix, click on the
Appendix link in the box to the right
of the article online.
17 Designation of drugs for rare dis-
eases or conditions, 21 U.S.C. Sect.
360BB (2011).
18 Projan SJ.Why is big pharma getting
out of antibacterial drug discovery?
Curr Opin Microbiol. 2003;6(5):
427–30.
19 Sertkaya A, Eyraud J, Birkenbach A,
Franz C, Ackerley N, Overton V,
Outterson K. Analytical framework
for examining the value of anti-
bacterial products [Internet]. Wash-
ington (DC): Department of Health
and Human Services; 2014 Apr [cit-




20 Food and Drug Administration.
Draft guidance for industry on anti-
bacterial therapies for patients with
unmet medical need for the treat-
ment of serious bacterial diseases.
Fed Regist. 2013 Jul 2;78(127):
39737–8.
21 Rex JH, Goldberger M, Eisenstein
BI, Harney C. The evolution of the
regulatory framework for antibac-
terial agents. Ann N Y Acad Sci.
2014;1323:11–21.
22 Frank C, Himmelstein DU,
Woolhandler S, Bor DH, Wolfe SM,
Heymann O, et al. Era of faster FDA
drug approval has also seen in-
creased black-box warnings and
market withdrawals. Health Aff
(Millwood). 2014;33(8):1453–59.
23 Ginsberg A. The TB Alliance: over-
coming challenges to chart the fu-
ture course of TB drug development.
Future Med Chem. 2011;3(10):
1247–52.
24 Doshi P. US incentive scheme for
neglected diseases: a good idea gone
wrong? BMJ. 2014;349:g4665.
25 Ridley DR, Grabowski HG, Moe JL.
Developing drugs for developing
countries. Health Aff (Millwood).
2006;25(2): 313–24.
26 Food and Drug Administration. Es-
tablishing a list of qualifying patho-
gens under the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Safety and Innovation
Act. Final rule. Fed Regist. 2014;
79(108):32464–81.
27 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. Acute inpatient PPS [In-
ternet]. Baltimore (MD): CMS; [cit-




28 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. New medical services and
new technologies [Internet]. Balti-
more (MD): CMS; [cited 2014




29 Shah H, Tallman AM, Capurso S.
Clarifications about add-on pay-
ments for fidaxomicin. Am J Health
Syst Pharm. 2013;70(12):1015–6.
30 Louie TJ, Miller MA, Mullane KM,
Weiss K, Lentnek A, Golan Y, et al.
Fidaxomicin versus vancomycin for
Clostridium difficile infection. N Engl
J Med. 2011; 364(5):422–31.
31 Kelly C, Karlin S. Antibiotic dis-
incentives? Medicare decisions un-
derscore limits of add-on payments
[Internet]. New York (NY): Pink
Sheet; 2014 Aug 18 [cited 2014






32 Boucher HW, Wilcox M, Talbot GH,
Puttagunta S, Das AF, Dunne MW.
Once-weekly dalbavancin versus
daily conventional therapy for skin
infection. N Engl J Med. 2014;
370(23):2169–79.
33 Brookings Council on Antibacterial
Drug Development. Incentives for
change: addressing the challenges in
antibacterial drug development
meeting; 2013 Feb 27; Washington
(DC): Engelberg Center for Health
Care Reform at Brookings; 2013.
34 Anomaly J. Collective action and in-
dividual choice: rethinking how we
regulate narcotics and antibiotics. J
Med Ethics. 2013;39(12):752–6.
35 Van Boeckel TP, Gandra S, Ashok A,
Caudron Q, Grenfell BT, Levin SA,
et al. Global antibiotic consumption
2000 to 2010: an analysis of national
pharmaceutical sales data. Lancet
Infect Dis. 2014;14(8):742–50.
February 2015 34:2 Health Affairs 285
at PAPPAS LAW LIBRARY
 on February 26, 2015Health Affairs by content.healthaffairs.orgDownloaded from 
